International Justice (PCIJ) was given a role of hearing particular laborrelated cases. The ILO was not accorded a judicial branch within its own organization, but rather was to make use of the general court of the protean international legal system. 9 Two types of judicial review were to be available for the ILO-first, a review of the report of a Commission of Inquiry, and second, a review of a member's compliance with the ILO constitution. 10 Under the Treaty, the ILO Governing Body was given the authority to ask the SecretaryGeneral of the League of Nations to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to examine the observance of an ILO convention by a party to it. 11 The Governing Body was able to act on its own motion, upon a complaint by a state party to a convention, or upon a complaint by a non-governmental or governmental delegate to the ILO Conference. The Commission was directed to report its findings and could make recommendations as to steps which should be taken to meet the complaint. 12 In addition, the Commission was to indicate appropriate measures, if any, of an economic character against the defaulting government. 13 That government then had recourse to the PCIJ to seek review of the findings and recommendations. 14 The second potential PCIJ referral regarded whether an ILO member government was fulfilling its obligation to bring each new ILO convention and recommendation before the domestic authority within whose competence the matter lies. 15 In the event that the member failed to take such action, any other member could refer this matter to the PCIJ. Although interesting for the precedential value to subsequent international organizations, neither type of judicial review eventuated during the life of the PCIJ.
Provision for judicial review of the acts of an international organization originated in 1921 in the Convention Instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube. 16 A "territorially interested" state was permitted to Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization • 221 9 On this issue, see, in this book, La Rosa. 10 The Treaty of Versailles also provided that questions or disputes relating to the interpretation of Part XIII or labor conventions were to be referred to the PCIJ. Id 
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Treaty of Versailles, arts. 411-412. 12 Id. art. 414. 13 Id.
14 Id. art. 415. 15 Id. arts. 405, 416. 16 Convention Instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube, 23 June 1921, 17 AJIL challenge a decision of the International Commission of the Danube as being "ultra vires" or violative of the Convention. 17 This matter was to be heard by the special jurisdiction set up for that purpose by the League of Nations. Because the Commission could take decisions by a majority vote, this provision provided protection for losing interests. 18 The judicialization of trade relations began in the first multilateral treaty on trade restrictions-the Abolition Convention of 1927. It contained a general dispute procedure which provided for an optional advisory opinion by a technical body in the League of Nations and then, upon agreement, for arbitration or reference to the PCIJ. 19 For disputes of a legal nature, the treaty provided for a referral to the PCIJ. 20 The Convention of 1927, however, did not go into force. Later efforts under the League to provide for dispute settlement in trade matters were also unsuccessful. 21 After the war, the United Nations sponsored the effort to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) whose Charter contained a two-level procedure for the settlement of differences. Disputes were to be referred to the ITO Executive Board for investigation and recommendation. 22 A member government concerned could then ask that a review of the Executive Board's decision be conducted by the ITO Conference (of the parties). 23 Thereafter, the member government could seek an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that was to be binding on the ITO. 24 The provision for recourse to the ICJ was actually broader than bilateral trade disputes considered within the ITO. Under the Charter, a member whose interests were prejudiced by any decision of the ITO Conference could ask the Organization to seek review in the ICJ. 25 Thus, both types of international judicial review-of acts by a party and of acts by a branch of the Organization-were to be available in the ITO. Unfortunately, the ITO treaty did not go into force, and the trading system limped along with less judicial procedures under the advent of the WTO in 1995.
THE WTO JUDICIARY AND ITS INDEPENDENCE
In comparison to the historical examples noted in Part I, the judicial function in the WTO agreement is more limited. As Giorgio Sacerdoti has pointed out, there is an important distinction between remedies against acts of organs of international organizations and procedures for the settlement of state-to-state disputes. 26 What the WTO has is the latter. Its sui generis dispute mechanism has jurisdiction only for cases about whether one WTO Member's actions violate WTO law or impair trade benefits. 27 Thus, the WTO Agreement provides no right of action by a Member against an administrative action by the Organization, one of its subsidiary bodies, or the Director-General. 28 So far, this omission has not been subject to criticism. Indeed, one commentator who recently proposed a stronger role for the WTO Appellate Body in rendering interpretations of WTO provisions made clear that "the Appellate Body would not be empowered to strike down an "unconstitutional" pronouncement" of a WTO Council. 29 Only the member governments of the WTO may lodge cases. Thus, many actors that might have an interest in insisting that WTO rules be honored are excluded from the WTO judicial process. For example, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures requires that in conducting countervailing duty investigations, the national authorities are to accord industrial users and representative consumer organizations an opportunity to provide information relevant to the investigation. 30 Nevertheless, an industrial user or consumer group denied such an opportunity is not given any legal recourse in the WTO. Also lacking access are governments that continue to be excluded from WTO membership, such as Russia.
The WTO agreement dealing with member-to-member disputes is the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 31 Strictly speaking, the DSU did not create a "judicial" system. As Joseph Weiler has remarked, the WTO Appellate Body is not called a "court," even though " [t] hat is exactly what the Appellate Body is." 32 Weiler is right to say that the WTO has a court because the function performed by panels and the Appellate Body is adjudicative. 33 Many analysts have pointed to the "judicialization" or "legalization" of WTO procedures in contrast to the less juridical procedures in the WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 34 Invocation of the DSU by a Member is referred to as a "case" and as a "complaint." 35 A case or complaint can allege that there is an "infringement of the obligations," a "violation of obligations" or an impairment of benefits. 36 At the end of a proceeding, the panel issues a "report" (not termed a "decision"). 37 An appeal may be taken on "issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel." 38 Several weeks later, the Appellate Body issues its own report which may "uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel." 39 These reports may contain individual "opinions" but that must be presented anonymously. 40 The GATT panels were often described as "arbitral." The DSU contains a separate track for "arbitration" that is distinct from the regular panels that decide whether a party has violated WTO rules. Compare DSU art. 25 (arbitration) with arts. 6, 21.5 (panels The DSU panels have compulsory jurisdiction. As complainants, WTO Members agree to refrain from making a determination that a violation of the WTO agreement has occurred except through recourse to the DSU. 41 As respondents, WTO Members cannot delay the initiation of a panel beyond the first meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) at which the matter is raised. 42 The WTO dispute system differs from most other international organizations in that the DSB can authorize economic countermeasures against a government that fails to honor its WTO obligations. 43 This feature draws attention to the WTO and may lead governments to take their international obligations more seriously.
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The WTO's Judicial Branch
Many commentators see a distinct separation between the judicial and political branches of the WTO. For example, Frieder Roessler explains that "the purpose of the complex institutional structure established by the WTO Agreement is to divide decision-making power between different political organs-executive, legislative, as well as judicial." 44 José Alvarez warns that the "legalization" in the WTO "should not fool us into thinking that fundamentally political issues can simply be handed over to the WTO's judicial branch." 45 Joost Pauwelyn states that WTO panels and the Appellate Body "lead a separate existence as the judicial branch of the WTO." 46 Although the word "judicial" is not used, the organic act establishing the WTO does establish a judicial system. It comprises the DSB, the standing Appellate Body, and appointed panels. Each unit has a distinct function. The function of the DSB is to administer the DSU rules, establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, and maintain surveillance of governmental implementation of adopted reports. 47 The function of the standing Appellate Body is to hear appeals from panel decisions and, when needed, to recommend that the defending government bring its measure into conformity with WTO rules. 48 The "standing" nature of the Appellate Body shows the intention of the founding governments to establish a judicial entity. The function of WTO panels "is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities . . ." 49 In particular, the panels make an objective assessment of the facts and the applicability of and conformity with WTO rules, and then may recommend that the defending government bring its measure into conformity with WTO rules. 50 The DSB consists of representatives of all WTO members. 51 It is the DSB that actually makes the "decisions" in disputes by adopting panel and Appellate Body reports. 52 Because the DSB consists of nothing more than the member governments acting collectively, one can question whether there is truly a judicial branch in the WTO. Certainly, the DSU does not direct each government's representative on the DSB to act in any way other than in its own national interest. The status of the WTO General Council as a political/legislative body 53 -combined with the fact that the DSB is just the General Council by another name 54 -may seem to contradict the idea that the WTO treaty system provides for a distinct judicial function.
Nevertheless it does. A key procedural rule demonstrates that despite being formally subordinate to the DSB, the panels and Appellate Body do in fact have authority to adjudicate. 55 The key rule is that the DSB is GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 3, 64 (calling the process "quasijudicialization"); Roessler, supra note 44, at 323 ("the involvement of the WTO's executive branch in the dispute settlement process is a formality without any legal consequences"). directed to adopt panel and Appellate Body reports unless there is a consensus not to do so. 56 This rule of negative consensus means that any report proposed for adoption by the complaining party will automatically be adopted (because the complaining party would not join a consensus against adoption). This has been demonstrated consistently in WTO practice. 57 Although the stated purpose of the DSB is to settle disputes, the role of the Appellate Body in clarifying the law can have important systemic effects. Deborah Z. Cass hypothesizes that the Appellate Body has been "instrumental in building a constitutional structure with the WTO system." 58 Based on a review of WTO caselaw, she argues that the judicial interpretations "are changing the international trade law system and leading to a greater resemblance between it and a constitutional system." 59 If indeed the WTO is becoming more constitution-like, then the need for judicial independence becomes even more apparent.
Is There Judicial Independence in the WTO?
A simplistic answer to this question is that the WTO's judicial branch lacks independence because its central organ, the DSB, is a political body composed of Member representatives, and thus is hardly independent of governments. Yet that answer is not satisfactory. One needs to assess whether panels and the Appellate Body are independent. In other words, to what extent can panels and Appellate Body operate independently of: (1) the DSB and the WTO General Council, (2) the members of the WTO, and (3) the WTO Director-General and Secretariat? 60 A review of DSU rules shows that its drafters sought to insulate the Appellate Body and the panels from governmental interference. The DSU points to "independence of the members" as one criterion for choosing panelists. 61 Although the DSU does not explicitly address "judicial independence" within the WTO, it is interesting to note that several WTO agreements direct governments to provide for an independent judicial review of administrative proceedings. 62 So the normative importance of judicial independence was recognized by the parties drafting the WTO. The WTO Agreement places value on the "independent exercise" of functions carried out by "officials" of the WTO and by the representatives of the Members. 63 This statement relates to privileges and immunities.
Unlike a basic arbitral model, litigant governments do not get to choose anyone on the panel. As prescribed by DSU rules, the panel is chosen from a roster compiled by governments. 64 In each proceeding, the panelists are nominated by the Secretariat subject to the agreement of the disputing parties. If an agreement cannot be reached, however, the Director-General will appoint the panel and can add other names. None of the panelists can be a citizen of the disputing parties, unless the parties so agree. 65 Once appointed, WTO panels have authority to obtain needed information and to determine their jurisdictional competence. Information is addressed in DSU Article 13 (Right to Seek Information) which says that "Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate." It is interesting that this provision expresses a "right" for the tribunal itself. A recent study of the prerequisites for effective supranational adjudication notes the importance of a guaranteed capacity to generate facts that have been independently evaluated. 66 A similar point has been made by trade law scholars who underline that access to information is essential for WTO panels. 67 The question of the competence of the panel to determine its own competence is not specifically addressed in the DSU. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body has suggested that panels do have that competence. 68 
• International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement
62
The DSB selects the seven-person Appellate Body. 69 Its members have a four-year term with a possibility of reappointment. They cannot be affiliated with any government. So far, no women have been appointed. In any particular proceeding, a "division" of three members is selected via a rotation system. The governments in a dispute get no role in choosing the division hearing the appeal.
DSU rules seek to attain autonomy for panels and the Appellate Body. Article 14.1 says that panel and Appellate Body deliberations shall be confidential. In addition, other DSU provisions declare that "There shall be no ex parte communications with the panel or Appellate Body concerning matters under consideration . . ." 70 Although the panels rely upon a secondment of staff assistance from the WTO Secretariat, the Appellate Body has its own Secretariat. 71 From the time that the DSB establishes a panel to the time that the Appellate Body issues its report (or if no appeal to the time of the panel report), DSU rules do not provide any role for the DSB in the adjudicative process.
It is only after the reports are circulated that the DSB regains a role. Appellate Body reports are to be adopted by the DSB within 30 days and un-appealed panel reports within 60 days. 72 The DSB deliberations are to some extent pro forma since reports are almost certain to be adopted because of the above-mentioned negative consensus rule. Nonetheless, the DSU underlines "the right of Members to express their views" on a panel or Appellate Body report. 73 To facilitate discourse, members having objections to a panel report are directed to circulate written reasons at least 10 days prior to the DSB meeting. 74 During the DSB debate, government delegates will sometimes criticize the substance of an Appellate Body report. For example, when debating the Asbestos decision, India stated that it was difficult to agree with the Appellate Body's interpretation of the GATT's national treatment requirement. 75 The automaticity in adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports gives these bodies independence. As Philip M. Nichols suggested in 1996, the requirement of a consensus to block adoption "could create a partial de facto independence for the panels and the Appellate Body, which no longer must worry about crafting reports that appeal to all, or even a majority, of the members." 76 The workability of DSU rules for enabling panels and the Appellate Body to carry out their adjudicative functions independently is not being questioned today. Ironically, what is being questioned is whether the Appellate Body has grown too independent of WTO Members. This "problem" will be discussed in the following section.
Criticism of the WTO Judiciary
After seven years of experience with WTO dispute resolution, two lines of thoughtful criticism have emerged. One is that the panel and Appellate Body process has become too legalized and judicialized, and that the WTO should seek to regain the diplomatic ethos that existed in the GATT era. 77 The other is that the slow legislative branch of the WTOstemming from consensus decision-making-makes it impossible to fix an Appellate Body decision that is unacceptable to WTO member governments. 78 The most obvious unacceptable decision would be one that is legally flawed. But it would also be possible for the Appellate Body to interpret and apply the WTO as the drafters intended, 79 yet still achieve a result that is politically unacceptable to the contemporary WTO membership. Every year, new members join the trading system-30 governments since the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Moreover, much has happened in the world economy since the WTO rules were written in the early 1990s, and governmental attitudes have evolved.
Should the Appellate Body make a mistake or reach a legally correct yet politically unacceptable conclusion, legislative mechanisms are available in the WTO Agreement to address that problem. They include The Appellate Body has stated that "The purpose of treaty interpretation is to establish the common intention of the parties to the treaty." European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS62/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, para. 93.
an amendment, an interpretation, or a waiver. 80 The waiver is particularly suited to settle a dispute; for example, the WTO enacted waivers regarding bananas in 2001. 81 Of course, a waiver cannot change WTO law.
Utilizing any of these legislative methods is difficult however. As Frieder Roessler incisively explains: "The fear of being bound by majority decisions adopted by the political organs of the WTO was greater than the fear of being bound by decisions adopted by its judicial organs." 82 The basic decision-making rule in the WTO is action through consensus. 83 In the absence of a consensus, however, voting can occur. Some WTO amendments would require a two-thirds vote and others unanimity. 84 For adopting interpretations and approving most waivers, a threefourths majority of the WTO membership is needed. 85 So far, the WTO member governments have not made any amendments or issued any formal interpretations. Some waivers have been enacted, but none to revise law after an unpopular Appellate Body decision.
The difficulty of using the constitutionally provided ways to change WTO law has provoked resentment of the Appellate Body by the government delegates to the WTO. In essence, Roessler argues that some WTO disputes should be considered political rather than legal questions. He says:
"The adoption of the DSU led to a clear separation between the judicial and political organs determining the legality of trade measures. The now independent judicial organs should be even more cautious than the Contracting Parties and therefore refrain from using their interpretive power to confer decision-making authority upon themselves that the Members of the WTO have explicitly assigned to bodies composed of the Members." 88 These objections are supported by Jagdish Bhagwati who writes that "I have some sympathy for Frieder Roessler's view that the dispute settlement panels and the appellate court must defer somewhat more to the political process instead of making law in controversial matters." 89 Criticism has also emerged in the U.S. Congress centered on the contention that the Appellate Body is not giving the appropriate level of deference to national government administrative decisions. 90 The frustration with the Appellate Body intensified after the failed WTO ministerial conference in Seattle because the possibilities for formal changes in WTO rules seemed more remote.
The difficulty of countermanding the Appellate Body has led to initiatives to change the expectation of automatic adoption of Appellate Body decisions. For example, Claude Barfield argues that the "WTO is overextended and in danger of losing authority and legitimacy as the arbiter of trade disputes among the world's major trading nations." 91 Barfield sees a "constitutional flaw" in the WTO whereby the "highly judicialized dispute settlement system is stretched beyond its capacity to Interests of Humankind, in THIS VOLUME (noting that one contribution of the judge to the development of international law is that it may reduce the undue influence of the most politically powerful states). deliver decisions that WTO member states will accept as legitimate." 92 Barfield would correct this flaw by making it much easier for the DSB to nullify a troublesome panel or Appellate Body report. Specifically, he recommends that one-third of WTO members should be sufficient for setting aside such a report. 93 Barfield's solution may be worse than the problem, but many analysts agree that it is now too difficult to fix a bad Appellate Body decision. Thomas Cottier was one of the earliest to sound a warning. In April 1998, he pointed out that ". . . it takes a long time to correct rulings of the Appellate Body in consensus based negotiations, which are hardly active in between rounds. As a result, the concentration of power in the Appellate Body invites political pressure and may jeopardize the independence and authority of the new institution." 94 That treaties are often ambiguous is well known, and the WTO is no exception to that. Yet the WTO treaty is probably being interpreted today by a judicial body more frequently and intensively than any other multilateral treaty (leaving aside the two major European treaties). Some analysts argue that WTO adjudicators should exercise abstention or restraint in the face of a textual lacunae. In other words, the Appellate Body should not fill in the blanks, but instead wait for governments to do so. Yet, the DSU says nothing about abstention. Rather, it directs the Appellate Body to "address each of the issues raised" and states that the WTO dispute system should "clarify the existing provisions of those [WTO] tude to declare that existing WTO rules are ambiguous or do not explicitly cover the complained of conduct. 97 One of the earliest cases where the Appellate Body was confronted with a possible gap in the law was in 1997 in the Bananas dispute. The tiny nation of Saint Lucia wanted to be represented by counsel from the private sector, and yet some large governments-like the United States and Mexico-sought to prevent such representation, arguing that this was inconsistent with GATT practice and that no DSU rule permitted private lawyers. 98 The Appellate Body dispatched this objection quickly, holding that "it is for a WTO Member to decide who should represent it . . ." 99 This instance of interpreting textual silence received no subsequent protest within the WTO, and much acclaim in the trade bar. 100 Unlike the more controversial rulings on amicus briefs that transpired in subsequent years, the support for rule-making in Bananas by developing countries was probably due to its perceived benefits to them.
During its consideration of the appeal in the Asbestos case in late 2000, the Appellate Body-recognizing that amicus briefs would be submitted in this high visibility, health-related dispute-sought to institute a procedure for considering such briefs that would provide fairness and due process both to the parties as well as to potential amici from the public or private sector. 101 Its "communication" of the procedure drew a fusillade of complaints by governments, and led to an unprecedented special session of the WTO General Council where numerous government delegates criticized the Appellate Body in the middle of the ongoing Asbestos proceeding. 102 Of course, for executive or legislative officials to criticize judicial decisions (and judicial activism) is not illegitimate. Having a dialogue between branches of government is appropriate and useful. 103 ing the pendency of a case, government officials need to be careful in the means used to influence the judicial process.
ASBESTOS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER PRESSURE
The controversy over amicus curiae briefs in the WTO has received considerably scholarly attention, so only a brief summary will be given here. 104 In Shrimp, the Appellate Body ruled that a panel has authority to accept non-requested information, and is therefore not precluded from considering amicus briefs proffered to it. 105 In Lead Bars, the Appellate Body ruled that it had legal authority to decide whether to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs. 106 Both of these decisions were adopted by the DSB, although many governments criticized them during the debate. In Asbestos, the competent division of the Appellate Body-following a few days of consultation with other members of the Appellate Body and the parties to the dispute-promulgated a special procedure exclusively for the Asbestos appeal that set rules for any application for leave to file a written brief in the case. 107 Even as the Appellate Body was drafting and notifying these procedures, about nine private actors sent in submissions, thus confirming the Appellate Body's assumption that there would be considerable interest in offering nongovernmental views. 108 The announcement of the new procedure led to a furor in the WTO and a call for a meeting of the General Council. 109 In the days running up to the General Council meeting, the Appellate Body rejected all of the applications for leave to file an amicus brief. 110 After the General Council meeting, the Appellate Body continued to reject all applications and to discard an actual amicus brief. 111 The Appellate Body did not give any specific reason for why it denied each of the timely applications. 112 The fragility of judicial independence in the WTO can be seen in the minutes of the General Council meeting convened to discuss the Appellate Body's action. 113 Almost all of the government delegates who spoke criticized the Appellate Body for adopting the new procedure, causing it to be posted on the internet, and for continuing to try to open WTO dispute settlement to amicus briefs despite the clear disapproval of this course expressed by many WTO governments. The governments evinced little uneasiness about insinuating themselves into an ongoing judicial proceeding. 114 Even the delegate from Canada, the complaining party in the dispute and an appellant, expressed concern that the Appellate Body division had chosen to adopt these new procedures. 115 Numerous criticisms were leveled at the Appellate Body. One was the Appellate Body had no legal authority to establish a procedure for considering petitions for leave to submit an amicus brief. 116 Only one government, the United States, countered that the Appellate Body did have such authority. 117 Another repeated complaint was that amicus briefs were not permitted because the governments had specifically rejected that possibility during the Uruguay Round. 118 This line of criticism shows that the real issue for many countries was not whether the public "Communication" in Asbestos was inadvisable; rather, it was that the Shrimp decision and its progeny were wrong. 119 119 The argument against the receivability of submissions from nongovernmental organizations could also be applied to intergovernmental organizations. The DSU has no provision that specifically permits a submission from, say, the UN Environment Programme in a trade dispute about turtles. By contrast, the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Article 34.2) states that the Court may request information from public international organizations relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by such organizations on their own initiative. that the Appellate Body members, having expertise in law, could not possibly need input from non-government briefs. 120 The delegates probably thought they were being clever in making this point, yet it is troubling if one takes it seriously, because the governments are saying that the Appellate Body should not have control of its sources of information. Finally, another common criticism was that the Appellate Body had ignored the remonstrations of WTO Members following previous decisions that countenanced amicus briefs. 121 In other words, the delegates were arguing that if governments express displeasure with a decision that they adopt, the Appellate Body should take account of these viewpoints in future adjudications.
Although prominent political scientists have suggested that the Appellate Body "is certain to take into account political constraints and potential opposition when making its final decision," 122 that is a different point than whether the Appellate Body has an obligation to do so. 123 In my view, the Appellate Body does not. Debate in the DSB would not seem to qualify as "subsequent practice" in treaty interpretation under Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Even assuming that it does, how is the panel and the Appellate Body to know what occurs at the DSB? The minutes of each meeting are not posted on the WTO website until about 11 months after the meeting takes place. Thus, the notion that the Appellate Body and panels are required to follow the mood of the DSB is problematic. Furthermore, even if the Appellate Body and panelists gain access to the DSB minutes and read them, one wonders whether it would be appropriate for the jurists to cite as legal authority a source that the general public will not be able to read.
The delegate from India made the further point that the fact that the Appellate Body had "totally ignored" the "sentiments" expressed earlier in the DSB raises doubts about the utility of the provisions in DSU that provide for Members to express their views on an Appellate Body report. 124 According to India, "these provisions provided for communication channels between the membership and the judicial organs of the WTO and were meant to serve a purpose." 125 Perhaps the Indian delegate is right about the intentions of the drafters. Yet it could also be that with attendance at the DSB limited to Member delegates and WTO staff, the expression of Member views about adopted reports is meant solely for their own edification.
While the numerous statements to impugn the Appellate Body are troubling, far more troubling were the efforts of the governments to use the General Council meeting to interfere with the Appellate Body's ongoing handling of the Asbestos appeal. For example, Egypt (speaking for a larger group of developing countries) urged that the action of the Appellate Body "be resented and reversed." 126 Colombia (on behalf of Andean nations) declared that "the procedure adopted by the Appellate Body had to be abolished. . . ." 127 Singapore (on behalf of ASEAN nations) suggested that because the "procedure was contrary to the prevailing sentiment of the majority of Members, the Appellate Body should withdraw it." 128 Pakistan urged the General Council to "invite the Appellate Body to withdraw the invitation for amicus curiae briefs in response to the wishes of the majority of the membership." 129 Cuba proposed that the Appellate Body be invited to "reconsider its decision and refrain from applying it until the General Council reached an agreement on this [amicus] issue." 130 Tanzania said that the Appellate Body should "withdraw its action." 131 In the end, the General Council did not make a decision because it lacked a consensus to do so. 132 Nevertheless, the chairman of the Council stated that he would communicate the points raised at the meeting directly to the Appellate Body. 133 As noted above, the Appellate Body had already rejected all of the amicus petitions in the run-up to the General Council meeting. As one delegate told Inside U.S. Trade, "the Appellate Body seemed to hear the message." 134 WTO panelists "feel part of the judicial branch" of the Organization. 138 In making this recommendation, Weiler notes the way that the European Court of Justice sought to instill in national judges a relationship of partnership in ensuring the rule of law. Weiler leaves the discussion there, but one could extend the lesson he sees further. In my view, the WTO should authorize the Appellate Body to commence a program for developing a closer relationship with national judges. For example, a judicial conference might be held every year or two to discuss interstitial issues of WTO law and national law.
This chapter looks at whether judicial independence exists in the WTO. Recognizing that "[a] constitution is a continuing process, not a single event," 139 I have examined both the WTO provisions and how they are being implemented. This review demonstrates a plentitude of judicial independence that flows from various DSU rules. The DSU provision giving a panel the right to seek information is an enabler of independence. The provision for automatic adoption of panel reports (unless a reverse consensus exists) was untested when it was written into the DSU. Yet so far that provision has succeeded in solidifying the WTO judiciary. Notwithstanding its various imperfections such as the Asbestos episode, the WTO sets a high bar for other international organizations that seek to instill judicial independence.
